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When different groups create models or ontologies 
of the same knowledge domain, this creates chal-
lenges for knowledge sharing. To identify these 
challenges, we compare cellular structure as mod-
eled by the Foundational Model of Anatomy 
(FMA), the Gene Ontology (GO), and the Cell 
Component Ontology (CCO). These ontologies all 
model the physical anatomy of a cell, and we ex-
pected them to be similar in scope. However, we 
discovered that the actual differences among them 
are substantial. These differences represent varia-
tions based on theory-driven vs. emergent construc-
tion, as well as differences in how small application 
ontologies like the CCO are created from reference 
ontologies. In this paper, we provide a description 
and analysis of these differences. By studying dif-
ferences in language, granularity, breadth of cov-
erage, and model organization, we hope to gain a 
better understanding of how to map between re-
lated ontologies. 
Introduction 
Ontologies are gaining widespread use within the 
rapidly growing bio-informatics community. This 
community is also committed to the notion of 
knowledge sharing, where results and data are 
made available to the whole research community 
(usually after publication). An important example is 
the Gene Ontology (GO), which enables research-
ers to use a common terminology for gene product 
annotation. More recently, a number of researchers 
have worked to expand and improve the Gene On-
tology, allowing researchers and intelligent systems 
to use GO annotations for advanced knowledge 
manipulation and inference [1].  
Unfortunately, as ontologies become more expres-
sive and more prevalent, it will become more im-
portant that we develop strategies to share knowl-
edge across multiple ontologies and knowledge 
sources. To answer queries that draw on multiple 
ontologies, it is necessary to map or link terms 
across those ontologies. Often, two or more groups 
may independently develop ontologies that cover 
the same, similar, or overlapping knowledge. Natu-
rally, one might like to combine these efforts and 
incorporate data and knowledge from all sources. 
This scenario describes our situation with respect to 
information about cellular structure as expressed by 
three different ontologies: The Foundational Model AMIA 2006 Symposium of Anatomy (FMA) [2], the Gene Ontology (GO) 
[3], and the Cell Component Ontology (CCO) [4]. 
While they all contain knowledge about cellular 
structure, we will show that these three ontologies 
are actually quite different. In this paper, we char-
acterize and quantify the differences among the 
subsets of the FMA, GO, and CCO that deal with 
cellular structure. Rather than suggesting that one 
ontology is better than another, we aim to under-
stand how they differ. In the long term, we hope 
that our methods and resulting categories of differ-
ences will generalize across any pair of ontologies.  
The Foundational Model of Anatomy, 
the Gene Ontology, and the Cell Com-
ponent Ontology 
The main purpose of the Foundational Model of 
Anatomy is to provide a baseline model of human 
anatomy upon which to conduct other research [2]. 
Constructed using the Protégé frame-based system 
[5], the FMA makes extensive use of hierarchical 
“is-a” relationships to classify and interrelate 
terms. As a whole, the FMA is a formal, theory-
based representation of anatomical structure from 
the organism level down to the macromolecular 
level. Because our goal is to compare ontologies 
that describe cellular structure, we selected only the 
subset of the FMA dealing with the cell, cell part, 
and macromolecule.  
The Gene Ontology is widely used by researchers 
in molecular and cell biology to annotate gene 
products with function, process, and cell compo-
nent information [3]. Created in 1998, the GO was 
originally devised as a common terminology for 
research concerning model organisms such as Dro-
sophila (Flybase) and Arabidopsis (TAIR). As a 
community-based resource, it has since grown to 
include more than 17,000 terms covering a broad 
range of biology, from bacteria to Homo sapiens. 
Because we are only interested in the cellular com-
ponent section, we do not discuss the process or 
function portions of the GO.  
The Cell Component Ontology (CCO) was created 
as part of the AraCyc project for use in annotating 
anatomical parts from the Arabidopsis plant [4].  In 
contrast to reference ontologies like the FMA, the 
CCO is an application ontology intended to support 
descriptions of pathway knowledge for Arabidop-
sis. As a result, terms in the CCO are selected al-
most exclusively from the GO. This reflects a pur-Proceedings Page - 16
poseful limitation of the CCO ontology scope. In 
addition, the AraCyc group classifies all of the 
terms into a more rigorous “is-a” hierarchy, adding 
terms where necessary to support this structure.  
While the FMA, the GO cell component, and the 
CCO cover similar domains, there are notable dif-
ferences among them. At a high level, it is impor-
tant to consider basic philosophical differences in 
ontology development. The FMA is designed as a 
reference ontology: It is not designed for any spe-
cific application, but instead designed to be used by 
multiple types of applications and users.[2] Thus, it 
is built according to a set of rigorous modeling 
principles, so that each term is carefully defined, 
appropriately located, and linked to other terms in 
the ontology [6]. Although focused on Homo 
sapiens, the FMA provides a framework for model-
ing generic anatomy, and thus, some higher-level 
terms are meant for mammals or vertebrates [2].  
In contrast, the GO models a canonical cell across 
multiple species, and is designed for a specific pur-
pose—annotation of genomic research. As a con-
sortium-controlled ontology, new GO terms are 
added whenever consortium members believe that 
those terms are important for annotation. In cases 
where a term is species specific, the GO uses a 
“sensu” tag to indicate the corresponding organism. 
As a model of a canonical cell, the GO excludes 
information specific to particular cell types, unlike 
the FMA, which models some cell types explicitly.  
The CCO is an “application ontology”; it is de-
signed with a more specific set of users and tasks in 
mind, namely, supporting pathway knowledge in 
Arabidopsis. Thus, it focuses on plant cell anatomy, 
and only at a particular level of depth and detail. 
Because of this variation in scope, and because the 
CCO is derived from the GO, our analysis first 
looks at FMA versus GO, and secondarily at how 
the CCO differs from its parent ontology (the GO).  
Methods 
Our analysis is based on a copy of the FMA from 
Jan., 2006, a version of the GO from Feb., 2006, 
and the CCO obtained in Feb., 2006. However, 
because the three ontologies are designed so differ-
ently, we do not treat the three equally. In particu-
lar, we focus primarily on the FMA vs. GO com-
parison. These two ontologies are similar in size, 
and they were developed independently. In con-
trast, the CCO is a much smaller application ontol-
ogy derived primarily from the GO—the great ma-
jority of its terms are directly linked (via GO ID 
numbers) to the matching terms in the GO. In fact, 
because of this relationship, the analysis of CCO 
vs. FMA is redundant with GO vs. FMA, so we 
will not discuss that comparison further.  AMIA 2006 Symposium PThere are 1,172 terms in our selection of the FMA 
and 1,807 terms in the cellular component portion 
of the GO. The CCO contains 150 terms. Before 
beginning our comparison, we removed 115 GO 
terms which were annotated as “obsolete” and re-
moved 10 duplicate terms, reducing our selection 
of the GO to 1,682 terms. 
Our initial analysis of the FMA and GO consisted 
of checking for direct term matches and synonym 
matches. The FMA and the GO both include lists 
of “synonym” terms which represent the same con-
cept. We started our comparison using only FMA 
preferred terms and GO preferred terms. In the 
results section, we categorize synonymy as one 
form of ontology difference.  
Initial analysis involved direct string matching to 
find the exact overlap between the GO and the 
FMA. Since they both cover cellular structure, we 
assumed that identical terms shared common se-
mantic meaning. Surprisingly, there were only 147 
exact string matches between the FMA and the 
GO. Thus our initial comparison of preferred terms 
left 1,025 terms from the FMA and 1,535 terms 
from the GO that did not match. Once synonyms 
were taken into account, the number of unique 
terms dropped to 972 for the FMA and 1,479 for 
the GO. 
For the GO vs. FMA comparison, our task was to 
analyze these 2,451 unmatched terms in order to 
understand why and how the two sets of terms 
were different. As shown in the results section, we 
looked for categories and clusters of differences. 
We did an extensive literature review to understand 
the biological basis behind each term. We also con-
ducted interviews with the anatomists from the 
FMA project to obtain their expert input. In addi-
tion, we made extensive use of ontology visualiza-
tion tools (for both the GO and the FMA) to assist 
us with our comprehension of the terms, both se-
mantically and structurally. 
Because of its small size and direct linkages to the 
GO, we were able to compare CCO vs. GO by 
hand. Below, we begin with our findings for the 
GO vs. FMA comparison, and then discuss the 
CCO vs. GO analysis in this context.  
Results 
Although the FMA and the GO purport to cover 
the same cellular structure, they are quite different. 
From our analysis, we define four fundamental 
categories of differences: language, depth of scope, 
breadth of scope, and ontological organization. 
Language differences account for two main types 
of simple differences. The first type includes dif-
ferences due to synonymy. These are terms which 
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significantly different terminology. As an example, 
"lamellar body" and "keratinosome" refer to the 
same biological concept. However, there is no sim-
ple way to correlate the two terms unless their se-
mantic meanings are known. The second type of 
language difference encompasses minor linguistic 
variations. This includes different grammatical 
forms of the same word, as well as minor variations 
in word order (e.g., axoneme of flagellum vs. flag-
ellar axoneme). Differences in this category can be 
handled by using a synonym mapping table.  This 
table can be constructed manually, or it can be built 
using an automated system to account for these 
linguistic variations.   
Differences in depth of scope represent new con-
tent that exists in only one of the ontologies. These 
terms have a corresponding term in the other ontol-
ogy but at a different level of granularity. We char-
acterize these differences into two types of relation-
ships: “is-a” and “part-of”. The “is-a” type of depth 
difference refers to shared terms, where one ontol-
ogy provides sub-categories of that term. For ex-
ample, delta-tubulin (FMA) is-a tubulin (GO), and 
cell-matrix junction (GO) is-a cell junction (FMA). 
Alternately, the “part-of” type of depth difference 
indicates that one ontology provides more par-
tonomic descriptions of that term. For example, 
matrix of endosome (FMA) is part-of endosome 
(GO), and actin cap (GO) is part-of actin (FMA).  
The breadth of scope category is similar to depth of 
scope; both categories include new concepts that do 
not exist in the other ontology. However, the 
breadth of scope characterizes terms from one on-
tology that are not related to any other term in the 
other ontology by either “is-a” or “part-of” rela-
tionships. We characterize those differences into 
three sub-types: subjective categorization, domain 
specificness, and novel concepts. Subjective 
categorization differences refer to terms that are 
defined by either the FMA or the GO in regards to 
their own perceptions of cellular structure. For 
example, endomembrane system (GO) and nuclear 
matrix proper (FMA) are concepts that rely on the 
anatomist’s view of how cellular structure should 
be segmented. 
The domain specificness sub-type describes another 
fundamental difference between the FMA and the 
GO, in that they are used for different research pur-
poses, with specific domains of interest. Therefore, 
they both choose to represent only those concepts 
that are relevant to their respective usage and inter-
ests. For example, the GO has non-human terms 
such as “viral capsid”, and the FMA has terms for 
specific human cell types such as “nucleus of cone 
cell”. We have labeled the third sub-type of breadth 
difference simply as “novel concept”. Novel con-
cept represents those terms that are neither subjec-
tively categorized nor domain specific. For exam-AMIA 2006 Symposium Pple, complexes (GO) and amino acids (FMA) are 
concepts that do not exist in the other ontology. In 
these two cases, the exclusion is by design—the 
ontology designers have chosen different bounda-
ries for the domain of “cellular structure”.  
Finally, the FMA and the GO also employ different 
ontological organization to express their different 
views of cellular structure. While the FMA focuses 
on an accurate structural representation, the GO 
describes a canonical view of the generic cell. Ac-
cordingly, a small percentage of terms are reserved 
for purely organizational purposes. These concepts 
typically do not map between ontologies, as they 
reflect the organizational design of an ontology 
rather than the modeled content. Therefore, unless 
two groups share similar ideas about how to organ-
ize the subject matter, differences in representation 
cannot be reconciled automatically. 
We sorted each of the 2,451 non-matching terms 
into one of the four categories as shown in Table 1. 
Our analysis shows the largest category of differ-
ences is breadth of scope, and the smallest category 
of differences is language variation. In addition, 
our results show that the FMA has a similar per-
centage of language and organizational differences 
as the GO.  The FMA has a slightly larger percent-
age of depth of scope differences than the GO, but 
a smaller percentage of breadth of scope differ-
ences.  
Using these categories of differences, we next ex-
amined the CCO and its relationship to the GO. As 
a GO-based application ontology, 90% of the CCO 
terms were taken from the GO, and so it largely 
avoids problems with language differences.  Of the 
remaining 10%, most were depth of scope differ-
ences.  This includes “sensu” variations for terms 
like plasma membrane and granularity for terms 
such as chloroplast thylakoid membrane, providing 
a greater level of depth than the GO. A small num-
ber of terms (such as “space”) represented onto-
logical organization differences and corresponded 
to terms in the FMA. In general, the overall inter-
section between the CCO and the FMA was low 
Table 1. The distribution of terms across our four 
categories of ontological differences between 
the FMA and the GO. 
 GO not in FMA (1479 terms) 
FMA not in GO 
(972 terms) 
Language 50 (4%) 58 (6%) 
Scope - Depth 211 (14%) 229 (23%) 
Scope - 
Breadth 1144 (77%) 629 (65%) 
Ontological 
Organization 74 (5%) 56 (6%) roceedings Page - 18
due to differences in species representation (CCO 
was created for Arabidopsis).  
While an application ontology would not be ex-
pected to include more breadth than a general on-
tology, it is interesting to look at the breadth of the 
terms contained in the CCO.  As might be expected, 
the majority of terms fall in the middle of the GO 
hierarchy. This demonstrates that the CCO includes 
fewer high-level terms than the GO. The CCO also 
features a decreased branching factor near the bot-
tom areas of the ontology as compared to the GO, 
again indicating a reduced breadth of coverage.  
Discussion 
We find the results in Table 1 surprising and inter-
esting along a number of dimensions. First, recall 
that we selected subsets of the FMA and the GO so 
that they would both cover only knowledge about 
cell structure. Thus, we initially expected small 
amounts of differences in scope of knowledge. 
Given the very small number of exact string 
matches, our first guess was that language differ-
ences would account for a large portion of the dif-
ferences. As Table 1 shows, this was not the case. 
Instead, there were very significant differences in 
both depth and breadth of scope, even within the 
relatively narrow domain of cellular structure. 
Next, given that there are significant differences in 
depth, we might guess that one ontology would 
provide more details than the other. In particular, 
we guessed that because the GO is at the genomic 
level, it would have more low-level detail than the 
FMA, which includes gross anatomy. However, it 
turns out that neither ontology is more detailed than 
the other. Instead, they are complementary; they 
include more and less depth in different places. Our 
results also show that the depth differences are split 
about evenly between “is-a” and “part-of” depth 
differences for both ontologies.  
Table 1 shows that the largest variation in our cate-
gorization is the breadth of scope difference. The 
large breadth disparity between the FMA and the 
GO is mainly due to four sorts of different types of 
knowledge. First, as part of its structural knowledge 
about the cell, the GO includes more than 670 
“complexes”, or combinations of proteins. Al-
though the FMA anatomists agree that complexes 
should be included in their ontology (personal 
communication), it currently does not include this 
knowledge. In a similar fashion, the FMA includes 
more than 400 terms that are lipids, glycoproteins, 
and amino acids. Just as the FMA does not include 
complexes, the GO intentionally does not currently 
include any of these terms. We categorize both of 
these breadth differences into the “novel concepts” 
sub-type.  AMIA 2006 Symposium PThird, the FMA includes about 140 terms that have 
to do with particular cell types within the human 
(E.g., “cell body of olfactory receptor cell”). As 
mentioned earlier, because the GO represents 
knowledge about the canonical cell, such concepts 
are excluded from the GO. Finally, the GO in-
cludes almost 400 terms that are specific to particu-
lar species or classes of species, such as “viral cap-
sid” (for virus) and “thylakoid” (for plants). Such 
terms are excluded from the FMA since they are 
not relevant for Homo sapiens. These two types of 
differences we assigned to the “domain specific” 
sub-type of breadth differences.  
Just as for depth, it is interesting that neither ontol-
ogy is broader than the other. The ontologies are 
again complementary, with each providing more 
breadth in some areas than the other.  
The differences in the ontological organization 
category are not surprising. The FMA has more 
“is-a” ontology organization terms than the GO, 
while the GO includes more “part-of” organiza-
tional terms. We expected this result because the 
FMA is more structurally rigid and formalized than 
the GO [6]. Thus, the FMA uses organizational 
terms to maintain consistent use of the “is-a” rela-
tionships between terms, while the GO uses a mix-
ture of “is-a” and “part-of” relationships to organ-
ize terms. Interestingly, the CCO also chooses to 
establish a more formalized “is-a” hierarchy than 
the GO even while borrowing many of its terms.  
We recognize that our four categories of ontologi-
cal differences may be somewhat ad hoc. However, 
we developed these over a significant period of 
iterative data analysis and with the help of biology 
and anatomy experts. In addition, our categories 
are consistent with the work of others who have 
compared large ontologies [7]. Our goal is to find a 
set of categories that can be used to analyze differ-
ences between any pair of ontologies.  
Broader Implications and Conclusions 
The process of creating inter-ontology mappings 
has several implications, particularly when it 
comes to querying across a domain area. Projects 
such as Biomediator [8] make use of an intermedi-
ate schema to translate queries across sources. 
However, this approach still relies on the ability of 
domain specialists to map their knowledge to this 
shared schema. Thus, understanding how to build 
better mappings across knowledge sources would 
have broad implications. Below, we discuss the 
implications for each of the four different sorts of 
differences that we found: language, depth, 
breadth, and organizational differences. 
Language differences are by far the easiest and 
most straightforward to map. As these sorts of roceedings Page - 19
terms represent a direct mapping between concepts, 
the only challenge is in determining synonymy be-
tween them. Mappings between synonymous terms 
across ontologies could lead to more complete 
synonym lists, which would allow for greater inter-
operability and ease of use by researchers. 
It is more interesting to consider those terms which 
represent differences in depth of scope. Such terms 
typically map across ontologies via a common par-
ent term. A proposed mapping would then consist 
of many-to-one mappings between the child terms 
and the common parent. Such mappings are inher-
ently more complex than the one-to-one mappings 
for synonymous terms: They are non-symmetric, 
they must specify whether the child-parent relation-
ship is “part-of” or “is-a”, and they provide only 
related information, rather than truly linked infor-
mation between ontologies.  
When terms vary by breadth of scope, the challenge 
is even greater. In general, it will not be feasible to 
construct mappings for all differences in breadth of 
scope. For example, terms may be intentionally 
excluded by developers of either ontology as be-
longing outside the scope of that ontology. In our 
example, this is the case for species specific GO 
terms that should not be mapped to anything in the 
FMA. However, identification of these breadth dif-
ferences may suggest areas for further refinement 
within an ontology. For example, the anatomists 
developing the FMA have expressed interest in 
including some GO terms that fall into this breadth 
difference category, such as protein complexes.  
While terms which vary in scope may potentially 
provide some information across ontologies, terms 
referring to ontological organization are typically 
unique to a particular ontology. It seems unlikely 
that such organizational terms would be readily 
mapped across ontologies; they have no shared 
physical reality and they may require significant 
changes to the organization of many other terms.  
There is established interest in creating mappings 
between biomedical ontologies, including work by 
Zhang and Bodenreider to automatically align the 
FMA with the GALEN Common Reference Model 
[7]. From our perspective, their work focuses on 
language differences. We find it interesting that in 
both comparisons (FMA vs GALEN or FMA vs 
GO) there are relatively few terms that can be con-
nected by resolving these language differences: 
about 9% of the total number of terms. As we de-
scribed above, differences in breadth and depth are 
much harder to align than language differences.  
As collaborative research increases, and as the 
number of biomedical ontologies increases, we 
expect that there will be a growing need to analyze 
and understand the overlap and differences among 
ontologies. A use of our categorization of differ-AMIA 2006 Symposium Pences may be in the realm of semi-automatic map-
pings. If we can first categorize the sorts of differ-
ences, then it may be more clear which sorts are 
amenable to automatic methods rather than more 
manual work.  
To summarize, by looking at cellular structure in 
the Foundational Model of Anatomy, the Gene 
Ontology, and the Cell Component Ontology, we 
arrived at four categories of differences. These 
categories have different implications for how easy 
it may be to establish linkages across the ontolo-
gies. We hope that our analysis will aid in the crea-
tion of more compatible ontologies, as well as as-
sist with knowledge sharing and automated align-
ment between existing pairs of ontologies. 
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